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Realigning the American Consumer 
Bankruptcy System with the Goals of the 
Fresh-Start Doctrine:  A Global Comparative 
Analysis 
ASSAF LICHTASH∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Two decades ago, consumer bankruptcy had not yet assumed an 
impactful role in most countries’ economies.1 In its nascent stages, 
consumer bankruptcy was primarily practiced and developed in the 
United States, the world leader in the use of consumer credit.2 In the 
past two decades, consumer credit grew around the world and it served 
as a nucleus for the growth of consumer bankruptcy.3 The proliferation 
of credit card companies has extended the democratization of credit to 
include consumers from around the globe, and has become a ubiquitous 
practice.4 As a result of this unfettered global access to credit, the 
relationship between consumers and money has fundamentally 
changed.5 
The increase of access to credit has led the consumer lifestyle to 
become both strongly reliant on debt and more costly as people borrow 
funds to purchase that which they cannot afford.6 For many individuals 
today, life’s necessities, such as housing and education can only be 
 
∗ J.D., Loyola Law School, 2012; B.A., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2008. I would like to 
thank my wife, Charlene, for her love, support, and insight throughout the process of writing this 
article. 
 1. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 1 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen, Ian 
Ramsey, & William Whitford eds., 2003). 
 2. Id. at 12. 
 3. Id. at 2–5. 
 4. Id. at 2–3. 
 5. See Charles J. Tabb, Lessons From the Globalization of Consumer Bankruptcy, 30 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 763, 773 (2005). 
 6. Niemi-Kielsilainen, supra note 1, at 2–3; see JACOB S. ZIEGEL, COMPARATIVE 
CONSUMER INSOLVENCY REGIMES: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE 30–35 (2003). 
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obtained through loans, which put a growing number of consumers at 
risk of becoming over-indebted.7 As a result, many individuals find 
themselves in precarious financial conditions where any unforeseen 
turmoil could lead to insolvency.8  
Liberal access to credit is often cited as the cause of the global 
growth in consumer bankruptcy filings around the world.9 In the United 
States alone, annual bankruptcy filings have soared to over 1.5 million 
petitions in recent years.10 Legislatures have adopted different 
approaches in response to the global explosion in bankruptcy filings.11 
Although the approaches of the various states differ in their 
implementation, they all strive to offer debtors a “fresh-start.”12 The 
main tenet of the fresh-start doctrine is the desire to provide relief to 
honest individuals, who by some misfortune have become insolvent.13 
According to this doctrine, such individuals should be afforded the 
opportunity to restart their financial lives, unencumbered by previous 
debt.14 The most efficient and common way to offer a fresh-start is by 
discharging most, or all, of the consumer’s pre-bankruptcy debt.15 
A disagreement among policy-makers revolves around the scope 
of discharge. Some scholars say that granting permissive access to 
discharge encourages reckless financial behavior among consumers and 
contributes to the climbing number of bankruptcies.16 Others claim that 
barring access to discharge stifles entrepreneurship and hurts the middle 
 
 7. Niemi-Kielsilainen, supra note 1, at 3. 
 8. Id. at 4. 
 9. Kent Anderson, The Explosive Global Growth of Personal Insolvency and the 
Concomitant Birth of the Study of Comparative Consumer Bankruptcy Consumer Bankruptcy in 
Global Perspective, 42 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 661, 667 (2004); Ronald J. Mann, Optimizing 
Consumer Credit Markets and Bankruptcy Policy, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 395, 402–04 
(2006); see JASON J. KILBORN, COMPARATIVE CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 99–100 (2007) 
[hereinafter KILBORN, COMPARATIVE]. 
 10. WILLIAM D. WARREN & DANIEL J. BUSSEL, BANKRUPTCY 507 (7th ed. 2006).  
 11.  Id. at 51; Rafael Efrat, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy in Modern Day Israel, 7 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 555, 556 (1999) [hereinafter Efrat, Israel]. 
 12.  Efrat, Israel, supra note 11, at 571. 
 13.  IAN  F.  FLETCHER, THE  LAW  OF  INSOLVENCY 34 (1st ed. 1990). 
 14. Efrat, Israel, supra note 11, at 555; Mechele Dickerson, Consumer Over-Indebtedness: 
A U.S. Perspective, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 135, 144 (2008).  
 15.  See WARREN, supra note 10, at 508; see also Efrat, Israel, supra note 11, at 558–59 
(making a fresh-start option available promotes the efficient allocation of the risk of loss between 
debtors and creditors). 
 16. See Todd J. Zywicki, Why So Many Bankruptcies and What To Do About It: An 
Economic Analysis of Bankruptcy Reform, 57 (George Mason Law & Econ. Ctr., Working Paper 
No. 03-46, 2003) [hereinafter Zywicki, Bankruptcy Reform], available at 
http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/03-46.pdf. 
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class, who most rely on consumer credit.17 This dispute, between those 
who wish to limit debtor access to discharge of debt and those who wish 
to expand it, is the focus of the discussion here. The purpose of this 
article is to revisit the balance built into the American bankruptcy 
system vis-à-vis the availability of discharge, and to ultimately consider 
a shift toward a new balance in consumer bankruptcy.  
Part II of this article will briefly describe the goals of the fresh-
start doctrine. These goals will be the standard against which the rest of 
the discussion about fresh-start legislation will be measured and will 
guide the subsequent evaluation of various forms of this legislation. 
Part III of this article will provide an overview of the formation of 
current American bankruptcy laws, and the positions taken by those 
who either oppose or support them. This part will introduce the tensions 
and hurdles faced on the road to forming a more workable standard for 
consumer bankruptcy in the United States. 
Part IV of this article will discuss fresh-start legislation in England 
and Wales, France, Germany, and Israel, and identify the various policy 
tools used by lawmakers to both treat and prevent bankruptcies. 
Part V of this article will apply the policy tools identified in Part 
IV to the American bankruptcy system and will discuss the difference in 
approaches to implementing the fresh-start doctrine. Finally, this part 
will offer a new balance for discharge in the United States that will 
better adhere to the goals of the fresh-start doctrine. 
II.  THE GOALS OF THE FRESH-START DOCTRINE 
While policy-makers differ on the scope of the doctrine,18 all fresh-
start laws share the same core goals:  treatment of existing over-
indebtedness, and prevention of future over-indebtedness.19 The first 
goal of the fresh start doctrine is the principled need to provide 
humanitarian relief, and treat over-indebted consumers.20 This goal is 
divided into three requirements. The first requirement is the enactment 
of a fair and efficient debt-forgiveness mechanism at the heart of the 
consumer bankruptcy system.21 The second is that a country’s consumer 
bankruptcy system allows debtors to keep certain items that are deemed 
 
 17. See generally Margaret Howard, The Fragile Middle Class: Americans in Debt, 17 
BANKR. DEV. J. 425, 427 (2001). 
 18. See, e.g.,  Efrat, Israel, supra note 11, at 556. 
 19. Rafael Efrat, Global Trends in Personal Bankruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L. J. 81, 82 (2002) 
[hereinafter Efrat, Global Trends]. 
 20. See Efrat, Israel, supra note 11, at 568–71. 
 21. Id. at 556. 
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essential for their self-sufficiency and human dignity.22 Together, these 
two requirements are guided by a humanitarian aspiration to aid over-
indebted individuals in repairing their financial lives.23 Finally, the third 
requirement is that legislatures treat the underlying causes of the 
debtor’s financial failure.24  
The second goal of the fresh-start doctrine addresses the inevitable 
cost of bankruptcy to society and attempts to discourage irresponsible 
financial conduct.25 In an effort to prevent over-indebtedness the 
doctrine identifies two parties to which the risk of loss can be allocated, 
namely the debtor and the creditor.26 One theory is that the party who 
can best prevent the risk of loss and efficiently insure against it should 
bear the risk.27 Policy-makers differ, however, as to which of the two 
parties have such capacity.28 Some contend that the debtors, in having 
the power to make conscious decisions to incur debt, should bear the 
risk of loss.29 Others maintain that creditors are better suited to bear this 
risk, because they possess the ability to deny loans to unreliable 
applicants, and they can ultimately afford the cost of faulty 
investments.30 
The two goals of the fresh-start doctrine are inversely related. A 
pro-creditor approach posits that permissive access to discharge would 
encourage debtors to incur dangerous and risky loans.31 Under this 
approach, a prudent policy would limit debtors’ access to discharge.32 
The pro-debtor approach, however, maintains that liberal access to 
discharge would give creditors an incentive to avoid giving dangerous 
loans.33 These two opposing views on the implementation of the fresh-
start doctrine define the gamut of varying global approaches to the 
structure of bankruptcy systems.34 The next chapter will discuss where 
the American Bankruptcy System is situated on this spectrum. 
 
 22. Id.  
 23. See id. at 558. 
 24. Id. at 556. 
 25. See id. at 558–60. 
 26. Id. at 558–59. 
 27. See id. at 558. 
 28. Id. at 558–59. 
 29. Id.  
 30. See id. at 559. 
 31. Id. at 562. 
 32. Id. at 559. 
 33. Id. at 562–63. 
 34. Id. at 559–63. 
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III. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN THE UNITED STATES 
The United States, much like its counterparts in Europe and 
elsewhere, has suffered from a sharp increase in consumer bankruptcy 
filings in recent decades, reaching 1.41 million filings in 2009.35 
Striking the appropriate balance between the availability of and 
limitations on relief has long vexed American policy-makers.36 
Between the passage of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code and reforms 
introduced in 2005, American bankruptcy law provided nearly 
unfettered consumer access to debt discharge, also known as Chapter 7 
bankruptcy.37 The Chapter 7 discharge mechanism, still available today, 
requires debtors to submit all of their non-exempt property for 
liquidation and distribution to creditors. In return, their entire unsecured 
debt is expunged.38 As bankruptcy filings continued to rise throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s, creditors, scholars, and politicians called for 
reform.39  
What followed was a deeply contentious discussion between pro-
creditor and pro-debtor advocates.40 Pro-creditor advocates argued that 
the cause of the uncontrolled rise in bankruptcies was abuse of 
discharge by debtors.41 According to these advocates, many debtors 
chose to discharge their entire debt, even when they were able to repay 
some or all of it.42 On these grounds, pro-creditor advocates maintained 
that consumer access to discharge should be strictly limited.43 Opposing 
this theory, pro-debtor advocates claimed that the reason for the rise in 
bankruptcies was not abuse, but rather strong consumer reliance on 
credit.44 According to this theory, Chapter 7 bankruptcy served as a 
 
 35. Sara Murray, Personal Bankruptcy Filings Rising Fast, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126263231055415303.html. See Donna McKenzie Skene, 
Consumer Bankruptcy Law Reform in Great Britain, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 477, 477 (2006) 
(discussing a similar situation in the U.K.).  
 36. WARREN, supra note 10, at 507.  
 37. National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Report of the National Bankruptcy Review 
Commission  (1997);  Title 11, Bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (1978); Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.  
 38. WARREN, supra note 10, at 509. 
 39. Corinne Ball & Jacqueline B. Stuart, The Battle Over Bankruptcy Law for the New 
Millennium, 55 BUS. L. J. 1487, 1487, 1489 (2000). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 16; Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of 
the Bankruptcy Crisis, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1463, 1540 (2005) [hereinafter Zywicki, Bankruptcy 
Crisis]. 
 42. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Crisis, supra note 41, at 1540. 
 43. See Zywicki, Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 16, at 57–60, 96. 
 44. Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND. L. 
J. 1079, 1080 (1998). 
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necessary safety net—especially to middle class consumers—and 
limiting it would render consumers defenseless against the threat of 
insolvency.45 
The American battle over the future direction of consumer 
bankruptcy was temporarily settled in 2005 with the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(BAPCPA).46 Creditors aggressively spearheaded and lobbied for the 
BAPCPA on Capitol Hill.47 This legislation drastically restricted 
consumer access to Chapter 7 bankruptcy by implementing a system 
called the “means test,”48 by which the debtor was classified according 
to his or her income. According to this test, any bankruptcy petitioner 
whose household income is over the median in his or her state of 
residence is subject to a rebuttable presumption of abuse.49 To rebut this 
presumption, the petitioner must show that his or her disposable 
household income50 does not exceed one hundred dollars each month.51 
This rigid requirement prevents a large number of consumers from 
getting a fresh-start from their over-indebtedness.52 
Petitioners who are ineligible for Chapter 7 bankruptcy under the 
2005 legislation can enter a repayment program called Chapter 13 
bankruptcy.53 Under Chapter 13 the court creates a three- to five-year 
repayment plan, during which the debtor must repay some, or all, of his 
or her debt.54 If the debtor fails to make timely payments, the court can 
dismiss the petition and the debtor may be left without recourse.55 Pro-
debtor advocates do not view the Chapter 13 repayment plans as an 
adequate alternative to Chapter 7 discharge, because they claim it falls 
short of the basic goals of the fresh-start doctrine.56 According to 
BAPCPA, debtors can keep their post-bankruptcy earnings only under 
Chapter 7; under Chapter 13 such earnings are at least partially 
 
 45. WARREN, supra note 10, at 515–16. 
 46. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act §§ 201–34. 
 47. WARREN, supra note 10, at 507. 
 48. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act § 102(h); see Charles J. 
Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 12–18 
(2001). 
 49. WARREN, supra note 10, at 474; 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2011). 
 50. “Disposable Income” is current monthly income less amounts reasonably necessary for 
the maintenance or support of the debtor or dependents and less charitable contributions up to 
fifteen percent of the debtor’s gross income. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (2011). 
 51. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b). 
 52. WARREN, supra note 10, at 517–18. 
 53. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b). 
 54. WARREN, supra note 10, at 539. 
 55. See id. at 539; 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(4) (2011). 
 56. WARREN, supra note 10, at 510. 
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designated for repayment.57 In addition, time has shown that Chapter 13 
repayment plans often fail and are difficult for courts to administer.58 
Thus, the goals of the fresh-start doctrine are best advanced by Chapter 
7 bankruptcy, which, under BAPCPA, is no longer available to a many 
consumers.59 
The aftermath of the BAPCPA led to intensified opposition by pro-
debtor advocates.60 According to a 2005 study, about half of all 
bankruptcies in the United States were caused by large medical bills that 
drove households into insolvency.61 This important finding discredited 
BAPCPA supporters’ main premise that the rise of bankruptcy filings 
was due to debtor abuse.62 With the advent of the 2008 financial crisis, 
consumer demand for bankruptcy has continued to rise, and the voices 
calling for reform have only intensified.63 Some scholars are calling for 
the BAPCPA to be repealed and insist that such action by Congress 
should be on the horizon.64 
IV. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES 
While vigorous public debate was taking place in the United States 
over consumer bankruptcy, legislatures across Europe and elsewhere 
were dealing with a similar spike in bankruptcy filings.65 The 
democratization of credit has now become a global phenomenon, 
making consumers around the world ever more reliant on debt.66 Much 
like the U.S. Congress, the legislatures of the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, and Israel have all enacted fresh-start laws.67 The different 
 
 57. WARREN, supra note 10, at 36; 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (2011). 
 58. See Ian Domowitz & Elie Tamer, Two Hundred Years of Bankruptcy:  A Tale of 
Legislation and Economic Fluctuations 36–37 (May 1997) (unpublished manuscript) (submitted 
to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission). 
 59. WARREN, supra note 10, at 517–18. 
 60. See Thomas Evans et al., An Empirical Economic Analysis of the 2005 
Bankruptcy Reforms, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 327, 327–28 (2008). 
 61. See David U. Himmelstein, et al., Marketwatch: Illness and Injury as Contributors to 
Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFF. (Feb. 2, 2005), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/suppl/2005/01/28/hlthaff.w5.63.DC1. 
 62. See U.S. Gov. Accountability Office, Bankruptcy Reform:  Value of Credit Counseling 
Requirement Is Not Clear, GAO-07-203 (2007). 
 63. Renuka Rayasam, Tidal Wave of Foreclosures Will Force Bankruptcy Reform, 
KIPLINGER (Oct. 10, 2008), 
http://www.kiplinger.com/businessresource/forecast/archive/Tidal_Wave_of_Foreclosures_Bring
s_Actions_081010.html. 
 64. Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING 
INST. 115, 120–21 (2009). 
 65. See Niemi-Kiesilainen, supra note 1, at 1, 3. 
 66. Id. at 3. 
 67. See infra Part IV.A–D. 
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legislatures, however, have applied varying approaches to implementing 
the fresh-start doctrine.68 This chapter will examine how these countries 
treat over-indebtedness by providing debt relief to a growing number of 
consumers, and how they prevent the rise of bankruptcy filings by 
allocating the risk of loss to debtors and creditors. 
A.  England and Wales69 
1.  Treatment:  Imposed Out-of-Court Settlements and Post-Bankruptcy 
Contributions 
Bankruptcy in England and Wales is governed by the Insolvency 
Act of 1986, which was substantially amended by the Enterprise Act of 
2002.70 The British bankruptcy system offers two tracks for relief:  a 
negotiated-repayment-plan track and a coercive-bankruptcy track.71 
The goal of the negotiated repayment plan track is to have an 
Individual Voluntary Agreement (IVA) reached between the debtor and 
the creditor.72 Throughout this process, the debtor retains the services of 
an Insolvency Practitioner.73 Together they devise a three- to five-year 
repayment plan, which must be authorized by creditors holding at least 
75 percent of the debtor’s unsecured claims.74 Although they were used 
in approximately 40 percent of insolvency cases in 2006, IVA plans 
often fail.75 As a result, debtors, who may incur expenses of up to 
$24,000 in managing their IVAs,76 risk being left in worse financial 
distress than before and without substantial relief in case of default.77 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Although the Insolvency Act of 1986, and the subsequent Enterprise Act of 2002 apply 
to all of Britain, the discussion here is limited to the parts of the code that govern England and 
Wales, but not Northern Ireland and Scotland. 
 70. Insolvency Act of 1986, 1986, c. 45; Enterprise Act of 2002, 2002, c. 40; Donna 
McKenzie Skene & Adrian Walters, Consumer Bankruptcy Law Reform in Scotland, England 
and Wales 4, 7 (July 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (available at 
http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/research/persdocs.htm). 
 71. Insolvency Act of 1986, 1986, c. 45, pt. VIII; KILBORN, COMPARATIVE, supra note 9, at 
88. 
 72. Ian Ramsey, Bankruptcy in Transition: The Case of England and Wales – The Neo-
Liberal Cuckoo in the European Bankruptcy Nest?, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE 205, 211 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen, Ian Ramsey, William Whitford eds., 2003). 
 73. Id. at 217. 
 74. KILBORN, COMPARATIVE, supra note 9, at 88. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 88–89. 
 77. Id at 89. 
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The second form of relief offered by the Enterprise Act is 
discharge.78 The majority of British debtors receive full discharge from 
their unsecured debt as early as one year after the commencement of 
bankruptcy.79 In order to qualify for full discharge, the debtor must 
show an inability to repay the debt and pay costs of approximately 
nineteen hundred dollars.80 An interesting feature of the English version 
of discharge is its requirement that some debtors make contributions to 
their discharged debt out of any surplus income for up to three years.81 
The choice of who is required to pay is left to the discretion of the 
Official Receiver, a government official who manages the bankruptcy 
process in England and Wales.82 Surprisingly, as a result of this 
provision, the percentage of English bankruptcy cases in which debtors 
repaid at least a portion of their debt has doubled to nearly 20 percent of 
all cases.83 
2.  Prevention:  The “Third Way” Approach 
The Enterprise Act of 2002 marks a significant reform in the 
British insolvency system. This Act was inspired, to a large extent, by 
the American spirit of entrepreneurialism and its place in the structure 
of the American bankruptcy system.84 English legislators were drawn to 
the “tailwind” the American bankruptcy system provided to 
entrepreneurs through its lax approach to discharge in Chapter 7 
bankruptcies.85 As a result, British legislators intended to legislate a new 
approach to discharge that would bolster entrepreneurialism, and offer a 
safety net to consumers who wish to engage in risk taking.86 
This strategy emerged out of a political philosophy that 
predominated the ruling British Labour Party at the time, the so-called 
“Third Way.”87 The Third Way is a centrist methodology of policy 
making, which addresses all facets of a problem by developing an 
approach that reconciles right-wing economics with left-wing political 
 
 78. Enterprise Act of 2002, 2002, c. 40, pt. 10. 
 79. Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40 § 256 (Eng). 
 80. KILBORN, COMPARATIVE, supra note 9, at 89. 
 81. Ramsey, supra note 72, at 218–22. 
 82. Id. 
 83. KILBORN, COMPARATIVE, supra note 9, at 89. 
 84. Iain D.C. Ramsay, Functionalism and Political Economy in the Comparative Study of 
Consumer Insolvency: An Unfinished Story from England to Wales, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
625, 646 (2006). 
 85. See id. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 655. 
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thought.88 Third Way policy makers in England believed that a careful 
and thoughtful implementation of regulatory instruments could help 
form a healthy consumer credit market, where both debtors and 
creditors conduct themselves with financial responsibility.89 
Such regulatory instruments range from better credit scoring and 
new consumer credit rights, to self-regulation.90 This goal is detailed in 
the U.K.’s Department of Trade and Industry’s (DTI) Plan to Tackling 
Over-Indebtedness. It states:  
Working with our partners in the credit industry, the voluntary sector 
and consumer groups, the Government seeks to minimise the number 
of people who become over-indebted and to improve the support and 
processes for those who have fallen into unsustainable debt . . . Our 
aim is to get to a position where consumers have the capability and 
information they need to make informed decisions about borrowing 
and where lenders make responsible decisions about whether and 
how much credit to grant.91  
Currently, DTI produces annual reports that describe the steps 
taken each year to ensure these goals are met.92 The reports focus on 
various policies that, in concert, are believed to “put out the fire” of 
over-indebtedness, without denying individuals the opportunity to enter 
free enterprise and engage in responsible risk taking.93 These policies 
include:  
[D]evelopment of a national strategy for financial capability; 
increases in affordable credit through development of credit unions 
and alternative models of affordable credit; introduction of a 
“stakeholder suite” of financial products to promote asset savings; 
investigation of the role of interest rate ceilings; strengthening of 
credit licensing and attacks on unfair lending practices; attack on 
illegal money lending; improved data sharing to underpin 
responsible lending decisions; increases in the funding of free and 
available debt advice; alternative dispute resolution for debt disputes; 
the improvement of insolvency with the introduction of a “no income 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Dep’t for Work & Pensions, Tackling Over-Indebtedness Action Plan 2004 1 (2004) 
[hereinafter Tackling Over-Indebtedness], available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file18559.pdf. 
 92. Id. at 7. 
 93. Id. at 8–9. 
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no asset” procedure; and finally, improvement in housing benefits 
and the administration of council tax benefits.94 
Despite the steps taken by the legislature, the outcome of the 
“Third Way” approach has yet to be seen. Between 2003 and the third 
quarter of 2006, there was a steady climb in personal bankruptcies, 
where the number of actual bankruptcies predominated compared with 
IVAs.95 Since 2006, the number of bankruptcies has steadily declined, 
with the portion of IVAs getting smaller each year and the portion of 
actual bankruptcies remaining the same.96 Although more time is 
required to determine its success, the English approach to prevention of 
over-indebtedness introduces a unique model of government actions 
extraneous to the bankruptcy system. 
B.  France 
1.  Treatment:  A System of Gradation 
Like the British system, the French insolvency system coerces 
parties to engage in out-of-court negotiations prior to filing for 
bankruptcy.97 In fact, the majority of insolvency cases in France are 
resolved in out-of-court settlements and only 35 percent of cases are 
reverted to the bankruptcy system.98 In contrast to the English 
government, however, the French legislature has attempted to avoid the 
use of discharge.99 The French insolvency system is designed to 
gradually intervene between debtors and creditors.100 The level of 
intervention is primarily guided by the status of the debtor; the more she 
is indebted, the greater role the insolvency system plays.101 The level of 
intervention is divided into three alternatives for relief, each of which 
gives rise to certain powers of the insolvency system over the parties:  
(i) “ordinary” forced renegotiation; (ii) “extraordinary” moratoria and 
partial forced discharge; and (iii) personal recovery.102 
 
 94. Ramsay, supra note 84, at 654–55. 
 95. Skene, supra note 70, at 60–61 figs.1 & 1a. 
 96. Dep’t for Bus. Enterprise & Reg. Reform, Tackling Over-Indebtedness: Annual Report 
2007 19 (2007), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file42700.pdf. 
 97. Maria Gerhardt, Consumer Bankruptcy Regimes and Credit Default in the US and 
Europe A Comparative Study, CEPS Working Document No. 318, CENTER FOR EUR. POL’Y 
STUD. 10 (July 2009), available at http://www.ceps.eu/files/book/1887.pdf. 
 98. KILBORN, COMPARATIVE, supra note 9, at 63. 
 99. See id. at 62–63. 
 100. Id. at 63. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. 
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i. “Ordinary” forced-renegotiations 
The “ordinary” forced-renegotiations alternative compels a 
creditor who is unwilling to yield to a reasonable settlement offer to 
enter renegotiations of the debt under the auspices of the insolvency 
system.103 A commission whose role is to make a preliminary settlement 
recommendation and facilitate communication between the parties 
controls renegotiation.104 The process may last for a period of up to ten 
years.105 
The commission’s authority to impose measures is limited to 
merely “ordinary” measures of relief, such as granting time extensions 
for payments and reducing the interest owed.106 The commission may 
order discharge of debt only where the mortgage on the debtor’s home 
is higher than the value of the property itself.107 Out of the 35 percent of 
insolvency cases whose out-of-court negotiations fail, one-third is 
resolved by means of “ordinary” forced renegotiations.108 Accordingly, 
80 percent of all insolvency cases in France are solved through either 
independent out-of-court settlements or a mild, albeit coerced, court-
directed compromise.109  
ii. “Extraordinary” moratoria and partial forced discharge 
Despite the relative success of “ordinary” forced renegotiations, 
this measure did not always prove sufficient.110 Some debtors who 
consented to the court-imposed payment plan were not able to satisfy 
their commitment to repay.111 It soon became clear to legislators that 
“ordinary” forced renegotiations offered insufficient solutions.112 Some 
debtors whose debt was too overwhelming were unable to follow 
through on any settlement plan and required a more extensive form of 
relief.113 In 1999, the French legislature took another step in the 
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direction of liberalizing relief and expanded the commissions' authority 
to undertake so-called “extraordinary” measures.114 
In cases of heavy over-indebtedness, the commission's authority 
becomes twofold. First, it may negotiate a settlement plan for a period 
of up to ten years, but the debtors and creditors must approve the 
settlement plan before it goes into effect.115 Second, at the end of the 
commission-imposed settlement negotiation, the commission may 
propose a moratorium to reexamine the debtor’s propensity to repay her 
debt, and the possibility of reverting back to “ordinary” measures.116 If 
the commission concludes that the debtor has not regained her ability to 
repay her debts, the commission has the authority to discharge some or 
all debt.117 
Following the passage of this law, commissions began to 
recommend some form of discharge to 18 percent of “extraordinary” 
cases in 2001, and approximately 30 percent in 2003.118 This rate has 
remained more or less the same since 2003.119 The French legislature 
continued to expand its liberal approach to discharge, and passed 
another law whose extent of discharge is similar to that of the United 
States’ Chapter 7.120 
iii. Personal recovery 
In 2004, the French legislature passed a law that offers full and 
immediate discharge to debtors whose insolvency is deemed 
“irremediable.”121 This law requires debtors to undergo a simplified 
“procedure of personal recovery.”122 Since its establishment in 2004, the 
number of debtors seeking “personal recovery” has doubled from 
16,321 to 33,378 in 2008.123 Procedurally, this law is similar to Chapter 
7 bankruptcy because it requires debtors’ assets to be turned over to a 
trustee or liquidator, liquidated, and distributed prior to discharge.124 
The difference between the French law and Chapter 7, however, is that 
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the French system reserves this extreme form of relief for only the most 
heavily indebted petitioners.125 
Since the adoption of the personal recovery law, the number of 
petitioners seeking personal recovery has soared.126 In 2006, 
approximately 25 percent of all cases were diverted to the personal 
recovery procedure.127 While the number of personal bankruptcies 
seeking personal recovery has significantly grown, this growth seems to 
have moderated in recent years.128 
2. Prevention:  Responsibility as a Two Way Street 
Traditionally, the French insolvency system has placed the cost of 
bankruptcy on debtors, demanding that they settle and repay their 
loans.129 This requirement, along with the legislature’s original shunning 
of discharge, has led consumers to take conservative risks.130 While the 
number of cases that settled amicably was almost an astounding 70 
percent between 1998 and 2003, French legislators began to recognize a 
need to offer greater access to discharge.131 By passing the liberalizing 
laws described above, the French legislature expanded access to 
discharge.132 Concomitant to liberalizing its discharge laws, however, 
the French legislature demanded accountability on the side of creditors 
as well.133 The French approach to prevention of over-indebtedness is 
founded on the concept of “responsibility as a two way street,” meaning 
both debtors and creditors must bear the risk of loss created by reckless 
financial behavior.134  
By enacting a credit rating system similar to that of the US, the 
French insolvency system views less favorably creditors who recklessly 
extend loans to debtors with poor credit, and makes creditors bear their 
share of the responsibility for consumer over-indebtedness.135 According 
to this law, the commission will determine what relief should become 
available, while “[taking] into account the knowledge of the debtor’s 
debt situation that each creditor might have had at the time of execution 
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of the different contracts.”136 The commission “may also verify that the 
contract was entered into with the seriousness imposed by standards of 
professional practice.”137 This approach puts a heavy burden on 
creditors, particularly those who extend credit to overextended 
debtors.138 
An additional method of holding creditors responsible is the so-
called “Stick Behind the Door” method, which refers to a requirement 
for creditors to engage in voluntary, and then possibly involuntary 
settlement negotiations.139 If creditors refuse to compromise with a 
debtor who is ready to negotiate, the court can penalize the creditors by 
granting the debtor a discharge.140 This practice gives debtors some 
leverage in negotiations, and makes creditors more willing to settle.141  
Although the last decade has seen a significant increase in the 
number of annual bankruptcy filings in France, it seems that France’s 
liberal legislation did have a moderating effect. After the first 
liberalizing laws were passed in the early 1990s, France witnessed a 
decrease in the number of bankruptcy filings.142 By 1996, however, the 
number of filings increased again, to approximately 95,000 in 1997.143 
By 2000, bankruptcy filings rose to 150,000 filings per year.144  This 
upward trend continued through 2003, when France witnessed a surge 
in personal bankruptcies.145 The subsequent liberalizing laws, passed the 
same year, were followed by relative stagnation in France’s annual rate 
of filings.146 One possible explanation for this slowdown is that the 
liberalization of the insolvency system, while risky, offered over-
indebted consumers a fresh-start without opening the floodgates to 
uncontrollable filings and possible consumer abuse.147 
France has taken a cautious approach, and has chosen to enact 
liberalizing laws over an extended period of time. Each law was 
carefully crafted to put the burdens created by bankruptcy on both 
debtors and creditors, and at the same time, moderated government 
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intervention where the parties could settle out-of-court.148 As a result, 
the rise of bankruptcy filings in France, while initially sharp, is now 
controlled, although a rise in unemployment is expected to increase the 
number of insolvencies as well.149 
C.  Germany 
1.  Treatment:  A “Period of Good Behavior” 
Compared to its European counterparts, the German insolvency 
system employs a unique approach to the treatment of over-indebted 
consumers.150 The purpose of its approach is to bridge the gap between 
the need of debtors to obtain discharge and the need of creditors to 
moderate consumer access to it, and have debtors repay their debts.151 
Similar to the English and French systems, the German system requires 
the parties to attempt out-of-court settlements.152 As with the French 
insolvency system, if out-of-court negotiations fail, the court tries to 
impose in-court negotiations.153 The uniqueness of the German system, 
however, surfaces when the parties fail to reach an agreement under 
coerced negotiations.  Following such failure, the court requires debtors 
to formally turnover all nonexempt, work-related income to a trustee.154 
The trustee is required to annually distribute portions of the funds to 
creditors.155 At the end of a six-year period, the court discharges most 
remaining debt, so long as the debtor has shown “good behavior” and 
adhered to the conditions and requirements of the plan.156 
The German legislature realized that imposing a six-year period of 
strict prerequisites on debtors is a daunting task that might lead them to 
default.157 In order to help the debtors maintain the required “good 
behavior,” the legislature enacted a series of periodical incentives that 
help debtors endure the six-year plan.158 At the end of the fourth year the 
trustee refunds debtors a sum equal to 10 percent of any non-exempt 
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income collected during the year.159 The refund increases to 15 percent 
in the fifth year, and the discharge at the end of the sixth year is 
considered the ultimate incentive.160 Another innovation of the German 
legislature is its requirement that debtors maintain “reasonable 
employment.”161  Failure to do so gives creditors the right to seek a 
denial of discharge. 162  
Based on the rigidity of these provisions, the German legislature 
did not intend to give discharge-seeking debtors an easy time.163 The 
policy behind this rather grueling six-year plan is a German perception 
that a discharge of debt is an extraordinary “privilege” that must be 
earned.164 The legislation also functions as a protective measure against 
frivolous and abusive petitions by debtors, which leads to the discussion 
on the Germany’s approach to prevention of future bankruptcies.165 
2.  Prevention:  Keeping Bankruptcy Unpleasant to Debtors 
The idea of discharge took time to settle in Germany.166 Even when 
discharge was finally made into law, the German legislature largely 
avoided the permissive Chapter 7 model of discharge.167  
Likewise, even the most socially-minded members of parliament 
disapproved of the concept of granting a “get-out-of-jail-free” card to 
German consumers.168  
By mandating a series of negotiations and imposing a six-year 
period of “good behavior,” the German legislature intentionally 
departed from the American model, and placed many hurdles in the 
debtor’s way to full discharge.169 The German word for the six-year 
period is Wohlverhaltensperiode, which literally translates to “good 
behavior period.”170 This reveals the hidden legislative intent beneath 
the surface of this law; namely, the desire to re-socialize the debtor and 
allow her to reenter the market as a contributing member.171 By 
imposing a six-year hiatus, the German system forces debtors to reflect 
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and take control over their financial lives, negotiate with creditors, and 
maintain working status in order to reach a fair outcome for all 
parties.172  
While the stigma attached to bankruptcy has not eroded, Germany 
experienced a period of increase in annual filings for personal 
bankruptcy.173 From 1999 to 2007, the number of personal bankruptcies 
in Germany exploded from 1,634 to 103,085.174 Despite the rise in 
filings, however, the German insolvency law has turned Germany’s 
insolvency system into a necessary evil rather than a convenient outlet 
for over-indebted consumers. 
Whether this law has succeeded in curbing the growth of over-
indebted consumers in Germany remains to be seen. In 2008, 
bankruptcy filings there receded to 95,730, and this statistic has not 
significantly changed since.175 The earlier rise in bankruptcy filings 
between 1999 and 2007 may be explained by the introduction of debt 
discharge in 1999.176 This policy opened the door to a great number of 
over-stretched consumers yearning for relief.177 The German legislation, 
however, by designing a harsh yet efficient treatment process, was able 
to control the rising number of filings, which possibly reached its 
equilibrium point by 2008.178  As of now, this explanation remains 
speculation, and the question of whether this legislation effectively 
prevents any further rise of filings in Germany still remains 
unanswered. The rate of bankruptcy filings in Germany over time will 
determine the success of this truly unique legislation. 
D.  Israel 
1.  Treatment:  Rigid Approach Toward Over-Indebted Consumers 
The Israeli bankruptcy system inherited the rigidity of the 
traditional English insolvency system.179 Due to some cultural and legal 
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variations, however, it evolved quite differently.180 As other developed 
nations liberalize their approach toward over-indebted individuals, 
Israel’s liberalization is occurring at a much slower pace.181 In the 
context of this article, Israel represents the most conservative 
application of the fresh-start doctrine. 
From its inception, the Israeli insolvency system has been defined 
by an unforgiving and, at times, hostile attitude towards over-indebted 
consumers.182 Legislators, judges and lawyers adopted this approach out 
of fear that permissive discharge would lead to the financial instability 
of Israel, which was a young, poor, and beleaguered country in the 
1950s and 1960s.183 Until the mid-1990s, debtors could face 
imprisonment—a decidedly heavy-handed approach—if they failed to 
repay their loans.184 In the 1990s, Israel experienced an increase in 
imprisonment orders issued against non-paying debtors, a statistic 
which led to reform in 1996.185 The reform adopted a pro-debtor 
approach, and favored the goals of the fresh-start doctrine.186 The legal 
culture in Israel, however, has hindered the reception of the reform, and 
its implementation.187 Currently, only one of the four districts in Israel, 
the Jerusalem district, fully yields to the liberalizing provisions put forth 
by the reform.188 This division has created an interesting reality in which 
two opposing paradigms of consumer bankruptcy exist side by side, 
creating a unique opportunity for comparison. 
The Official Receiver’s Office is the most influential body in the 
Israeli consumer bankruptcy system.189 It is a government agency that 
conducts all insolvency cases in its district.190 The focus of the Official 
Receiver’s Office is to find the reasons for the debtor’s financial 
failure.191 This focus is guided by the perception that debtors whose 
over-indebtedness is the result of reckless financial conduct are not 
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worthy of discharge.192 Therefore, the Official Receiver’s Office spends 
a good amount of time and effort in investigating the causes of debtors’ 
financial downfall.193 This harsh measure is particular to the Israeli 
bankruptcy system,194 and often intrudes on debtors’ privacy, a result 
running counter to the humanitarian purpose of the fresh-start 
doctrine.195 
Once the investigation is complete, and the debtor is deemed 
honest, she is obligated to make monthly payments to creditors.196  The 
amount to be paid is normally determined by the court,197 and the 
various benefits and protections awarded by the bankruptcy system, 
such as stay and discharge, are contingent upon the debtor’s 
payments.198 Since courts are given great discretion in determining the 
amount of monthly payments, the court’s considerations differ between 
the pro-debtor district, where the amount is normally low, and the pro-
creditor districts, where the amount is normally high.199 The pro-debtor 
and liberalized district bases the amount of monthly payments on the 
debtor’s ability to pay.200 In contrast, the pro-creditor districts base the 
amount on the size of the debtor’s debts.201 In addition to requiring high 
monthly payments, the pro-creditor districts mount bureaucratic hurdles, 
such as a prolonged waiting period for the issuance of a commencement 
order,202 which is required under court approval to begin the bankruptcy 
proceeding.203 Prior to such issuance, the debtor cannot be declared 
bankrupt and cannot enjoy the protections of the bankruptcy system.204 
While the commencement order is issued within three weeks in the pro-
debtor district, the pro-creditor districts take as long as eighteen weeks 
to produce this order.205 Debtors are also required to attend hearings in 
the pro-creditor districts, whereas the pro-debtor district does not 
require their presence.206 Ultimately, the inclination to give discharge is 
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greater in the pro-debtor district, and lower in the pro-creditor 
districts.207  
Therefore, the treatment of consumer bankruptcy in Israel is far 
from uniform as a result of the discrepancy between pro-debtor and pro-
creditor districts. Recent findings indicate that Israel’s annual rate of 
personal bankruptcy filings has surged by 2660 percent between 1995 
and 2010, particularly in pro-creditor districts.208 The reason cited for 
this surge in filings is the 2008 global economic crisis.209 Nevertheless, 
the controlled low growth of bankruptcy filings in the pro-debtor district 
might be an indication of future liberalizing reforms in Israel.210 
 
2.  Prevention:  Slow and Cautious Liberalization as the Key  
to Effective Prevention 
In 1997, Israel had approximately 0.16 bankruptcies per 1,000 
people.211 This statistic, in comparison with the United States (5 
bankruptcies per one thousand people)212 and the United Kingdom (0.47 
bankruptcies per one thousand people),213 would have been remarkable 
if Israel’s bankruptcy laws were more open to discharge.214 While the 
rate of growth of Israel’s consumer bankruptcy filings is still low, those 
of the United States and the United Kingdom continue to climb 
sharply.215 Israel’s strikingly low rate of bankruptcy filings can be linked 
to its harsh, and often unforgiving, treatment of debtors.216  
Israel’s policy tools for preventing the rise of bankruptcy filings, 
however, are not limited to its grudgingly given discharge, or the costly 
and unpleasant procedure imposed on relief-seeking debtors. Part of 
Israel’s economic policy is also to employ stringent restrictions on 
financial institutions, limiting the propensity of creditors to extend risky 
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loans.217 Stigma also plays an important role in curbing the number of 
people willing to resort to bankruptcy, which leads them to act with 
financial responsibility.218 
Based on these findings, it may be unjust to label Israel’s 
bankruptcy system as resoundingly pro-creditor. Israel’s policies can be 
described as cautious towards both debtors and creditor.219 Throughout 
its short and precarious history, the Israeli legislature knowingly put a 
heavy burden on both parties (with an admitted emphasis on debtors) in 
an effort to prevent bankruptcy filings and over-indebtedness and the 
inevitable financial instability.220 The Israeli approach is perhaps most 
helpful in demonstrating that incentives do work.221 While the 
implementation of the fresh-start doctrine in Israel is admittedly 
lacking,222 it is possible that Israel’s careful and slow liberalization 
might be the source of its success in steadily preventing bankruptcy 
filings. 
V.  REALIGNING THE AMERICAN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM:  
DEVISING A NEW APPROACH 
Discharge of debt is the most radical form of treatment for over-
indebtedness.223 Even the National Bankruptcy Review Commission in 
the United States, which holds a fairly pro-debtor approach to consumer 
bankruptcy,224 concluded in its 1997 report that the 1978 Bankruptcy 
Code’s permissive approach to discharge was flawed as originally 
enacted.225 While the United States has long maintained a liberal 
approach to discharge, the BAPCPA has led the American bankruptcy 
system to the other extreme, and adopted a strongly pro-creditor 
approach.226 With the passage of the BAPCPA, it is clear that Congress 
rejects the permissive Chapter 7 approach to discharge.227 The 
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alternative offered by the BAPCPA, however, fails to uphold the goals 
of the fresh-start doctrine.228 
The discussion above offers a rudimentary, albeit comprehensive, 
review of the various tools with which consumer bankruptcy policies 
were created in Europe and Israel. The following discussion will apply 
these tools to the BAPCPA, and consider new possible approaches to 
discharge of consumer debt in the United States.  
A.  Imposition of Out-of-Court Negotiations 
In reforming the American bankruptcy system, one must consider 
installing forceful policies that would encourage debtors and creditors to 
settle out of court. Such policies, which are pervasive in the three 
European countries examined, have proven a useful and amicable 
replacement to the coercive bankruptcy process, and do not burden a 
country’s judicial system since bankruptcy cases are kept out of court.229 
The English IVA model may not be the best one to follow. Due to 
its high cost, the IVA model exposes debtors to even greater 
indebtedness and leaves them without recourse if they fail to comply 
with the IVA repayment plan.230 Alternatively, the French insolvency 
system offers more tailored relief to debtors. The French legislature’s 
aversion to discharge and its decision to apply discharge only in 
correlation to the size of indebtedness has given debtors and creditors an 
opportunity to resolve their issues independently.231 As the parties fail to 
reach a solution, a commission is gradually given more power to force 
one upon them.232 The American Chapter 7 discharge model, which 
offers a single quick discharge to all forms of debtors, maximizes the 
loss creditors must suffer, and encourages debtors to act recklessly with 
relative impunity.233 Further, the Chapter 7 approach to discharge places 
a great burden on the judicial system, funneling all cases to courts, 
when some could reach out-of-court agreements. By making 
distinctions between debtors based on the size of their indebtedness, the 
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French insolvency system allows at least 80 percent of its bankruptcy 
cases to be resolved through settlements.234 
The French approach to out-of-court negotiations is largely defined 
by the “Stick Behind the Door” system.235 As discussed above, this 
system penalizes creditors who are unwilling to negotiate with a willing 
debtor by granting the debtor some type of discharge.236 American 
bankruptcy law does not have a similar provision. In fact, it actively 
denounces distinctions between creditors under Chapter 13 
bankruptcy.237 
The one provision that seems to require some out-of-court 
negotiation in U.S. Bankruptcy Code states that the court may reduce 
the creditor’s claim if a creditor “refuses to negotiate a reasonable 
alternative repayment schedule proposed on behalf of the debtor by an 
approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency.”238 This 
provision, however, loses its efficiency due to its own limitations. One 
limitation is that the “reasonable alternative repayment schedule” must 
have been made at least 60 days before the debtor’s bankruptcy filing; 
once the creditor makes it clear that it will not settle out of court, the 
debtor will immediately file for bankruptcy and not wait sixty days.239 A 
second limitation is that the debtor must offer to pay at least 60 percent 
of the payment to any one creditor within a “reasonable extension” of 
the original contractual repayment period.240 Needless to say, many 
debtors cannot afford to make such an offer.241 A third limitation is that 
the maximum punishment to creditors is a 20 percent reduction of their 
claim.242 This sanction is too low to deter creditors from refusing 
alternative dispute resolution.243 Therefore, despite the apparent 
inclusion of a “Stick Behind the Door” provision in the American 
Bankruptcy Code, this aspect of the code remains toothless and 
ineffective.244 
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B.  Adoption of a “Good Behavior Period” Approach to Discharge 
The American bankruptcy system ought to heed the unique “good 
behavior period” law of the German insolvency system. The “good 
behavior period” maintains both goals of the fresh-start doctrine by 
providing adequate relief to over-indebtedness, and attaches the risk of 
loss to both debtors and creditors.245 The six-year period mandated by 
German law can deter abusive conduct by making the process too 
protracted for abuse to be worthwhile.246 In addition, the German law 
wields a large “stick” over debtors in the form of the “good behavior” 
requirement, which demands the debtor maintain a working status.247 
With the promise of discharge at the end of the sixth year, debtors are 
strongly incentivized to endure the six-year period or lose the 
protections of the bankruptcy system by failing to comply with the 
“good behavior” requirement.248 
Enacting such a law in the United States would appease those who 
advocated for the BAPCPA by imposing an arduous path on the way to 
discharge, while at the same time upholding the goals of the fresh-start 
doctrine, which the BAPCPA approach currently does not maintain.249 
In addition, the focus of the German law is on debtors’ financial 
accountability.250 This is what ultimately sets the German insolvency 
system apart from that of the United States.251 While the BAPCPA did 
much to eliminate free access to discharge, it did little to evoke a sense 
of financial responsibility with consumers and encourage them to reflect 
on the long-term goals of their financial lives.252 One of the useful by-
products of the German law is the creation of a six-year buffer between 
the time of insolvency and the time of debtor’s re-socialization.253 It 
offers debtors an opportunity to reflect on what went wrong and how 
they can avoid insolvency in the future.254  
However, the application of the “good behavior period” approach 
in the United States is not without problems. Due to the United States’ 
modest social welfare system and its low wage exemptions, bankrupts 
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have little support to help them through a “good behavior period.”255 
With extensive welfare benefits and high wage exemptions, German 
bankrupts enjoy firm support and are, therefore, more likely to endure 
the protracted period than their American counterparts.256 The consistent 
failures of many Chapter 13 repayment plans bolster this argument.257 
C.  Adoption of a “Third Way” Approach to Prevent Over-Indebtedness 
The construction of an effective over-indebtedness prevention 
policy cannot be confined to the bankruptcy system alone. The “Third 
Way” envisions a consumer credit market in which both debtors and 
creditors are sufficiently informed and motivated to take reasonable 
risks and engage in responsible conduct.258 To promote this vision, the 
English DTI created the so-called “Over-indebtedness Action Plan,”259 
an effort to which future reformers ought to pay attention. 
Preventative measures should not be limited to provisions and 
incentives within the bankruptcy system, but should extend to the 
various extraneous players who shape the consumer credit industry.260 
The “Third Way” approach maintains that the task of preventing over-
indebtedness could go beyond mere incentives and actually set a 
standard of conduct within the industry.261  
A notable initiative by the British DTI is the introduction of a 
mechanism to investigate interest rate ceilings, which is intended to 
limit predatory loans extended to weak lenders.262 The 2008 subprime 
crisis was defined by the practice of extending high interest loans to 
risky debtors. Unscrupulous creditors generate large profit through this 
practice while ignoring the fact that debtors will ultimately become 
over-indebted.263 
Such efforts to extraneously curb over-indebtedness should 
coincide with the creation of limiting provisions within the bankruptcy 
system.264 Such provisions could include, for instance, laws that refuse 
to accommodate the interests of predatory creditors.265 In France, the 
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insolvency laws require courts to view the interests of predatory lenders 
in an unfavorable light.266 Currently, American bankruptcy laws do not 
offer such a distinction between abusive and non-abusive creditors and, 
in some cases, even proscribe it.267 Creating provisions that would 
galvanize the parties to be responsible, concomitant with efforts to 
influence extraneous players within the consumer credit industry, could 
effectively curb the yearly rise in bankruptcy filings.268 
One of the obstacles to undertaking such efforts in the United 
States is the existence of a federalist system, in which the authority over 
credit and debt regulation is divided between the state and federal 
governments.269 A concentrated government effort to tackle over-
indebtedness by adopting the “Third Way” approach requires greater 
control over the different players in the consumer credit market.270 
Therefore, if such efforts are to be seriously implemented in the United 
States, it must be done in concert between the states and the federal 
government. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In order to comply with the goals of the fresh-start doctrine, the 
American bankruptcy system should move away from the presumption 
that most debtors intend to abuse the system. At the same time, while 
debtors are not inherently abusive, the American bankruptcy system 
should not return to the lax approach to discharge applied in the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code. The realignment of the American bankruptcy system 
with the goals of the fresh-start doctrine means that while debtors are 
offered an opportunity to rejoin the consumer market, unencumbered by 
debt, proper safeguards are put in place to accommodate the interests of 
creditors as well. 271 
Such safeguards should exist in both the treatment of existing, and 
the prevention of future, over-indebtedness. As in France, most 
solutions of existing over-indebtedness should be made outside of court, 
and as part of a consensual and amicable settlement. It would benefit 
both parties and the judicial system if debtors and creditors were 
encouraged to resolve their issues without intervention. 
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Where intervention in the bankruptcy system cannot be avoided, 
such intervention should be need-based, and performed with care. If 
parties do not need strong intervention, the bankruptcy system should 
exercise only mild coercion that would help the parties obtain 
compromise. Where compromise seems impossible, it would be prudent 
to give full discharge. 
Discharge is a privilege, so in order to avoid a perverse consumer 
incentive to prefer extreme indebtedness in order to avoid repayment 
and compromise, a “good behavior period” system should be enacted in 
cases where full discharge is contemplated. By taking such measures, 
discharge would become a necessary evil to debtors, who would not 
rush to take risky loans. In addition, it would make creditors more 
selective in extending loans to consumers.272 
Furthermore, Congress should make sincere efforts to work with 
the consumer credit industry to promote a standard of responsible 
conduct. The combination of incentivizing provisions within the 
bankruptcy system and cooperation between Congress and the 
consumer credit industry will effectively prevent over-indebtedness.273 
Such efforts should concentrate on curbing abuse, such as predatory 
loans, that cannot be remedied through the bankruptcy system alone. 
Finally, the process of reforming the American bankruptcy system 
must not occur overnight. The Israeli insolvency system is a useful 
example in understanding the transition from a conservative to liberal 
bankruptcy system. While Israel’s transition is not complete and is not 
defined by efficiency, it provides financial stability to a country that 
suffers from regional geo-political instability.274 This gradual 
liberalization is also evident in the French insolvency system, which 
liberalized based on the need to offer debtors greater relief.275 In such 
precarious times, the American economy requires stability, and the 
lesson to be taken from the French and Israeli experiences is that any 
reform to the American bankruptcy system should not occur 
immediately, but over time. 
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